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1 There are many ways to categorise and present safety science approaches,
illustrated by e.g. Hollnagel (2004), Rosness et al. (2010) and Le Coze (2013).
2 A widespread misreading of Perrow is that he is only occupied with technological
structures, not social (see e.g. Hopkins, 2001). However, Perrow is also concerned
with the organisational level, clearly expressed in Perrow (1983). 3 But as we shall see soon, there are controversies in spe that we may dr
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This special issue invites to a debate to elaborate on differences and similarities between the perspectives
of High Reliability Organisation (HRO) and Resilience Engineering (RE). Such a debate may be conducted
along both essentialistic and pragmatic lines, and we suggest that the latter approach is potentially more
interesting and fruitful than the first. We use the technique of feeding off controversies and expand on
what might at first look merely like a polemic disagreement, a question of wording, namely the definition
of safety as a dynamic non-event. This elaboration is used as a projector onto a canvas where a number of
distinguishing themes between HRO and RE are outlined more clearly; symmetry, normativity, addressee
and origin are keywords that show how HRO and RE are different, and why they cannot simply be com-
bined into one grand theory of everything. Other concrete results from these investigations include a
review of applications of HRO and RE in health research, an elaboration of the distinction between
Safety I and Safety II, and a nuancing of how we may understand and study successful operations. We
suggest a research agenda that combines the scopes and methods of HRO and RE, possibly in combination
with other theoretical approaches. We also call for a more lively discussion on central themes of HRO and
RE, not for fighting over definitions and proving who is right, but with the aim of producing knowledge
that makes a difference regardless of theoretical stance.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
High Reliability Organisations (HRO) (La Porte, 1996; La Porte
and Consolini, 1991; Weick, 1987; Weick and Roberts, 1993;
Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) and Resilience Engineering (RE)
(Hollnagel et al., 2013, 2008, 2011, 2006; Nemeth et al., 2009) have
co-existed for more than a decade. Together with the Normal
Accident Theory (NAT) (Perrow, 1984), they represent three of
the more influential approaches to safety and accidents during
the last three decades.1 Both HRO and RE can be said to be a coun-
terweight to NAT, in more than one sense. While NAT is particularly
occupied with sociotechnical structures2 and also can be said to be
pessimistic with respect to the possibility of managing high-risk,complex organisations successfully in the long run, HRO and RE
pay more attention to the social conditions and the organisations’
strategies and abilities to cope with complexity. Although not unam-
biguously, there is a tendency to think of HRO and RE as less pes-
simistic than NAT about the possibility of successfully managing
high-risk, complex organisations.
The relation between HRO and RE has been one of co-existence
at arm’s length without any fundamental controversies between
them,3 but also without much explicit cooperation and cross-
fertilisation. Not strange, then, that the call for papers to this special
issue is marked by a subtle hesitation and uncertainty: Are HRO and
RE really different? Do we need both? And the question lurking in
the background: Do we really need a special issue on this?
Through this paper we will argue that the answers to those
three questions are all ‘yes’, but the answer must not be detached
from our pragmatic interpretation of the questions. Pragmatists as
we are, we believe that both HRO and RE will continue their work
independently of any conclusions in this issue, but still, the special
issue is important since it explicitly addresses a hesitation that has
permeated a significant proportion of the community of safetyaw upon.
.08.010
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sents a golden opportunity to establish a more fruitful dialogue,
and facilitate further progress for each of them, and cross-
fertilisation between them.
Themain objective of this paper is to explore the differences that
make a difference between HRO and RE. We do this by presenting a
pragmatic perspective on HRO, RE and the debate. Inspired by
Science and Technology Studies (Latour, 1987, 2005; Latour and
Woolgar, 1986), we consider controversies as a good point of depar-
ture to describe how different research strands account for safety.
Consciously exploiting – by feeding off rather than trying to recon-
cile – controversies is a fruitful strategy to clarify and raise aware-
ness of foundational epistemological aspects of HRO and RE
respectively. This method is operationalised into the very concrete
question of what safety really is to HRO and RE in terms of dynamic
non-events and dynamic events respectively, and how this perspec-
tive reflects their approaches and methods. In accordance with our
pragmatic approach, we will explore applications of HRO and RE
as they have travelled into the domain of health research.
Before we proceed, however, let us put the HRO-RE debate in
context by briefly recapitulating the older and somewhat faded-
out NAT-HRO debate. This is useful because this was a debate with
much clearer dividing lines from the beginning, and yet it faded
out in a deadlock (Rijpma, 1997, 2003) maintained by the essen-
tialistic question of who was right and who was wrong. We believe
there might be something to learn from that.
1.1. Recapitulating the NAT-HRO debate
From the mid 80ies and during the two following decades, the
debate between the two approaches of Normal Accident Theory
(NAT) (Perrow, 1984) and High Reliability Organisations (HRO)
(La Porte, 1996; La Porte and Consolini, 1991; Weick, 1987;
Weick and Roberts, 1993; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) was a central
point of reference and almost an obligatory passage point for those
interested in organisational safety theory. The two main axes of
arguments in the debate can be summarised as
(1) Is it possible or not tomaintain control over organisationswith
tight couplings and high interactive complexity? In brief, the
answer was ‘no’ according to NAT, and ‘yes’ according to HRO.
(2) Are the approaches of NAT and HRO complimentary and
compatible, or are they mutually exclusive and incompati-
ble? Some (e.g. La Porte, 1994; La Porte and Rochlin, 1994)
argued for compatibility,4 while others (e.g. Sagan, 1993)
argued for incompatibility.
This debate, whose appearance and temperament have declined
during the years, is useful to have in mind when invigorating a
debate that has been smouldering for some years now, ever since
Resilience Engineering (RE) (Hollnagel et al., 2006)5 consolidated
as a theory and was brought into the discourse of organisational
safety. From an essentialistic perspective the debate may be seen
to fade out in a deadlock.6 However, from a pragmatic perspective,4 This complementarity involves the view that Normal Accidents do exist and that
the conditions that Perrow describes are true, but they should happen more often
than we see in reality. Hence, normal accidents that don’t occur provide a context for
HRO to develop, and some blank spots for HRO to fill in.
5 2006 – or even 2003 with Woods (2003) – as a starting point of RE makes sense in
terms of when the publications referring explicitly to ‘Resilience Engineering’ started
to emerge, but as Le Coze (2016) nicely reviews, the development of RE can be traced
all the way back to the Three Mile Island accident in 1979.
6 One reason for this could be that the debaters are actually not discussing the
same types of organisations. Leveson et al. (2009) notes that Perrow’s argument that
redundancy may actually increase the risk of an accident is referring to complex,
tightly coupled systems, while HROs examples of redundancy protecting against
accidents actually are referring to loosely coupled systems.
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careful scrutiny of the operations of the U.S. nuclear forces during
the Cuba crisis. The empirical contributions of this study to our
understanding of organisations remain significant, whether or not
one agrees with Sagan’s interpretation of NAT and HRO and with
the feasibility of pitting NAT and HRO against each other in an
empirical study. Another important contribution that emerged from
the field of tension between NAT and HRO is Snook’s (2000) analysis
of the accidental shooting down of U.S. Black Hawk helicopters over
Northern Iran and his model of practical drift. Yet another example is
Weick’s (1990) argument, based on an analysis of the Tenerife air
disaster, that the NAT key concepts ‘‘interactive complexity” and
‘‘tight coupling” could fruitfully be viewed as dynamic and
situation-dependent. Weick and the so-called Michigan school
emphasise the role of sensemaking in dealing with critical situations
and thus complement the early HRO studies with an emphasis on
team cognition and team properties.
The HRO-RE debate is in many respects commensurable to the
NAT-HRO debate, and we can draw on experiences from the
NAT-HRO debate to shape the HRO-RE debate and actually let it
become a resource rather than merely a frustrating disagreement.
Both HRO and RE investigate and account for the preconditions and
work practices that are necessary to manage complex or intract-
able systems. And – perhaps because the dividing lines for this
theme are not as sharp as for the NAT-HRO debate – the second
theme gets even more imperative; hence this special issue: are
RE and HRO complimentary, and perhaps not even different in
essence, and do we in that case need both?1.2. NAT and RE
The dividing lines between NAT and RE have not been discussed
in a similar manner as those between NAT and HRO. NAT and RE
have in common a sociotechnical and systemic perspective on their
study objects, rather than an organisational perspective. An inter-
esting point of departure for a potential debate, however, could
be the way complexity is treated in NAT and RE respectively. While
NAT primarily treats complexity as an ontological entity referring
to sociotechnical structures, RE speaks of (in)tractability, and treats
this as an epistemological aspect (Hollnagel, 2008a).7 Tractability
does thus not refer to sociotechnical structures as such, but to the
degree that the functional relations within sociotechnical systems
are understandable to the organisations (Hollnagel, 2012a). Particu-
larly for essentialistic elaborations, it is important to be clear about
such differences in perspectives and terminology (for further elabo-
ration on epistemological and ontological issues in relation to the
sociotechnical systems that are portrayed by different approaches
in safety science, see also Haavik, 2014a; Le Coze, 2013, 2016).2. A pragmatic perspective
What are HRO and RE? The question may seem banal, but in
reality it may be answered in many different ways, and the answer
produces crucial conditions for how the further treatment of the
HRO-RE debate takes shape. To keep it simple and narrow it down
to two approaches, HRO, RE and the relation between them can be
approached essentialistically or pragmatically. An essentialist stance
would be based on an ontological and epistemological standpoint
that everything has an essence that can be described and under-
stood. It would involve a quest to define the unique properties
and the nature of the two schools of thought. A pragmatic stance
would be more oriented towards highlighting the practical applica-7 See also Haavik (2013: 51, 57) for more explicit explanation of the epistemolog-
ical view.
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used in different circumstances, with different purposes, and with
different results.
In essentialistic terms, HRO is a perspective and approach that
describes characteristics of organisations with high complexity
and tight couplings that experience extraordinarily few accidents,
despite the assumption that such systems – according to NAT
(Perrow, 1984) – cannot be satisfactorily controlled in the long
run. Two characteristic features of such organisations are their
organisational redundancy in terms of overlapping work tasks
and competencies, and their ability to reconfigure spontaneously
from clearly defined command lines to a more decentralised, infor-
mal decision structure in demanding situations or crises (La Porte
and Consolini, 1991). Another characteristic is summed up by the
five elements of mindfulness (Weick et al., 1999); preoccupation
with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, com-
mitment to resilience and deference to expertise. In similar essen-
tialistic terms, RE is a theory that explains the mechanisms of both
failures and successes in terms of variability and functional reso-
nance, and that particularly encourages studies of normal opera-
tions. ‘Safety II’ is a frequently used reference for the safety
perspective of RE, the advice being that we should ‘‘move from
ensuring that ‘as few things as possible go wrong’ to ensuring that
‘as many things as possible go right’” (Hollnagel et al., 2015: 4).
The relation between HRO and RE so far has been characterised
by mutual respect and an unspoken division of labour, so there has
actually not been much debate at all. To the degree that there has
been a real debate and confrontation, it has largely been confined
to the claim that HRO and RE are essentially the same (Hopkins,
2014). When key figures from HRO and RE appear on the stage
together (such as in Hollnagel et al., 2013), the tone is more one
of fraternisation than of challenge. Sympathetic as this is, there is
obviously both a desire and a need for more interaction and also
critical debate between the two, in which respect this special issue
is indeed very welcome.
Now, changing the perspective from essentialistic to pragmatic,
let us ask again: What are HRO and RE? From a pragmatic perspec-
tive, HRO and RE are actor-networks that produce a series of
things; they foster professional identities and communities of
science and research practice, they produce research, theory and
models that may be translated into organisational guidelines and
practices, they contribute to the discourse of safety as an entity
and a scientific field, they produce dividing lines within these dis-
courses, and they foster both fraternisation and controversies
across disciplinary territories.8 With this pragmatic perspective on
HRO and RE as a point of departure, we will show how we can use
these constructs actively to explore new terrains of safety science
and gain some new perspectives and insights that may be exploited
both by HRO and RE, and by the safety science community as a
whole.3. Feeding off controversies
There is one striking difference between the NAT-HRO debate
and the present HRO-RE debate: whereas the NAT-HRO debate
revolved around clearly articulated disagreements, the opposite
may be said to be the case of the HRO-RE debate – the articulated
disagreements are few and the dividing lines are unclear. Still, the
two communities seem to keep on living and practicing more or
less in parallel. Instead of asking why, which could easily invoke
essentialistic discussions and a possible stalemate, such as the
one experienced in the NAT-HRO debate, we will go straight to
the question of how to proceed from here: should we attempt to8 Bergström et al. (2015) adopt a similar perspective.
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erative distance? We shall here argue for proceeding at a coopera-
tive distance, indicate how this may be operationalised, and
illustrate the value of this approach by an example.
Bruno Latour, a philosopher of science and technology, is an
indefatigable investigator of science, sociotechnical systems and
the manufacturing of knowledge. Two central features of his
modus operandi are (1) to study science in the making (Latour,
1987; Latour and Woolgar, 1986) and (2) to feed off controversies
(Latour, 2005). Studying science (or sociotechnical systems, machi-
nes, organisations, theories, politics, etc.) in the making means to
study subjects while they are still in the making and when it is still
possible to identify all the heterogeneous elements and processes
that go into their fabrication. At later stages the subjects become
objects, and studying ready-made objects is much more difficult,
since at that stage the process of fabrication tends to be black-
boxed and impossible to trace. To feed off controversies implies
not to take for granted, a priori, what agencies the objects of
investigation are made out of, but rather to use that uncertainty
as a resource for further, meticulous exploration. Controversies
represent occasions where choices are made and directions are
changed, and whichever direction is chosen it could have been dif-
ferent – and that would have made a difference. In retrospect, after
the controversies have been settled, these occasions are often dif-
ficult to identify and it is not easy to see how it could have been
different – not to say: it is not easy to make it different after it
has been settled and stabilised.
With the HRO-RE debate clearly still in the making, and the con-
troversies still not having been settled, we are in a position not
only to make good sense of the debate, identify the actors and what
interests are at stake; we are actually in a position to reflexively
shape the debate and attempt to direct it where we think it should
be heading. However, as authors of this paper, we are in a different
position from that of Latour when he studied science in the mak-
ing. We are insiders in the safety science community. As insiders,
we may black-box or take for granted aspects of the research activ-
ity that an inquisitive outsider might choose to scrutinise. We have
also found it challenging to maintain a consistently pragmatic per-
spective. This may reflect the way in which we, as researchers, are
socialised to approach scientific controversies within our own field
in an essentialistic manner.
In the NAT-HRO debate, one main disagreement was as follows:
according to NAT, systems with tight couplings should be managed
by centralised control, while interactively complex systems require
a decentralised control. Systems that are both tightly coupled and
interactively complex could therefore in the long run not be suffi-
ciently controlled. According to HRO, however, organisations are
able to reconfigure in times of high activity or crisis, so that they
can provide either centralised or decentralised control, respec-
tively, when the conditions call for it. As a consequence, the dis-
agreement is very clear: while NAT states that systems that are
both tightly coupled and interactively complex are inherently
unsafe and should consequently be avoided, HRO states that such
systems may be controlled by organisations with the right capabil-
ities (redundant/re-configurable/mindful).
Now, what are the controversies that are central to the HRO-RE
debate? As we have already indicated, there are actually no clearly
articulated disagreements. And those being suggested by one of
the parties have a tendency to be embraced by the other party,
claiming that they mean the same thing! Proactivity, resilience
and adaptation – all these are organisational characteristics that
belong as much to HRO as to RE. But we should not necessarily look
only for those big disagreements. The dividing lines between dif-
ferent research strands have a tendency to appear clear and
uncompromising in retrospect, when each tradition has been con-
solidated and research practices have reinforced the dividing lines.perspective. Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.08.010
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research traditions, we need to be more sensitive to identify the
lines of discussion that make a difference and that may constitute
good grindstones for both sides. And we may need to follow the
advice of Latour to feed off those controversies in order to make
them useful for our purpose.
In the following we will identify and feed off a candidate for
controversy, and see if what it produces is of value to the HRO-
RE debate, and to the field of safety science.
3.1. Safety as a dynamic non-event vs safety as a dynamic event
A central argument in RE is the argument of symmetry that one
should learn not only from failures, but also from successes. Actu-
ally RE claims that there is more to learn from successes than from
failures: ‘‘Even if the probability of failure is as high as 104, there
are still 9999 successes for every failure, hence a much better basis
for learning” (Hollnagel, 2009: 83). This perspective of learning
from things that go right and not only from that which goes wrong,
has in recent years been associated with a splitting up of safety
into Safety I (primarily occupied with that which goes wrong)
and Safety II (occupied also with that which goes right)
(Hollnagel, 2014). Still, when faced with the Safety II perspective,
which can be said to be one of the main arguments of RE, propo-
nents of HRO will typically say that this is nothing different from
what is claimed by HRO: ‘‘Preoccupation with failure may seem
antithetical to the spirit of Safety-II. But not so if we consider safety
as a dynamic ‘non-event’” (Sutcliffe and Weick, 2013: 152). No
controversy there, in other words. However, if we pursue this
theme further, we see that the condition Sutcliffe and Weick point
out for embracing Safety II, is that safety is seen as a dynamic non-
event. Safety, or originally reliability, defined as a dynamic non-
event is a perspective that was introduced by Weick (1987) and
has been used widely since, almost without becoming subject to
controversy at all. However, although he describes the definition
as clever, Hollnagel (2014) finds it more reasonable to refer to
safety as a dynamic event.9 How can he do so when there seems
to be such agreement otherwise? Is this a difference that makes a
difference, or is it merely a different way of phrasing it?
We will pursue and feed off this controversy to see if it can add
value to the HRO-RE debate. We know a bit more about the mean-
ing of safety as a dynamic non-event, since this definition has been
circulating in the safety literature for quite a while. According to
Weick, safety is dynamic in the sense that ‘‘it is an ongoing condi-
tion in which problems are momentarily under control due to com-
pensating changes in components” (Weick, 1987: 118). Further,
‘‘safety is a non-event because successful outcomes rarely call
attention to themselves. In other words, because safe outcomes
are constant, there is nothing to pay attention to” (Sutcliffe and
Weick, 2013: 152).
Hollnagel’s doubt about the adequacy of Weick’s definition is
linked to the problem of counting:
‘‘Although the definition of safety as a dynamic non-event is
very clever, it introduces the small problem of how to count
or even notice or detect a non-event. A non-event is by defini-
tion something that does not happen or that has not happened.”
[Hollnagel, 2014: 6]
There is a way of overcoming this counting problem, he contin-
ues, since we may
‘‘(. . .) turn the tables, by defining safety as a dynamic event. The
event is now that an activity succeeds or goes well (. . .) The
non-event consequently becomes the situation when this does9 See also Haavik (2013: 7–8).
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events, i.e., the non-successes or failures, just as we have usu-
ally done. But we can now also count the events, the number
of things that go right, at least if we make an effort.”
[Hollnagel, 2014: 9]
At first, what Hollnagel does here may seem as nothing more
than a rhetorical trick. How else could it be explained that by turn-
ing the tables and calling successes events instead of non-events,
and failures non-events instead of events, both events and non-
events are suddenly countable? However, that would be an essen-
tialistic and ahistoric reading. If we keep in mind our pragmatic
perspective, viewing HRO and RE more as communities of science
and research practice than as models explaining behaviour and
outcomes and providing the ultimate formulae for safety, we
may read Hollnagel’s re-definition of safety as a dynamic event
as an expression of different visions – literally – different ways of
seeing associated with the traditions of HRO and RE. Now our feed-
ing off of the minor controversy starts paying off, as it is translated
into questions of the visible, the invisible and the practice of
seeing.
3.2. Visible, invisible and the culture of seeing
Are dynamic non-events invisible because they do not exist, or
because they do not call anyone’s attention? Although the term
non-event would suggest the former, we may deduce from
Weick’s (1987) elaborations, and his definition of dynamic, that
he is also referring to the latter. And when Hollnagel makes his
own twist on the definition of safety as an event, not a non-
event, it is to underscore the value of paying attention to things
that go right – events – by looking at normal operations (where
these events are so numerous). And here we are approaching a
central question, one that ties the threads together and brings us
right to the heart of the controversy: Do HRO and RE see the same?
Do they look for the same?
When one speaks of invisibility, it is crucial to be precise about
invisibility for whom? Vision and seeing refer to a cultural practice.
Goodwin (1994) has demonstrated this through his elaboration of
professional vision. And when Suchman (1995: 56) quotes Wellman
and writes about invisible work that ‘‘How people work is one of
the best kept secrets in America”, she articulates the observation
that in organisations, work practices are often invisible to others
than those who perform them. Managers and designers of instru-
ments, for example, may not be well aware of the shape and ratio-
nale for situated practices. Those actually performing the work, be
they Suchman’s secretaries10 or the professionals on aircraft carriers
portrayed in the HRO literature (Rochlin et al., 1987; Weick and
Roberts, 1993), know very well what they are doing. And with
respect to what researchers are aware of and see – including HRO
and RE researchers – there is much wisdom in the simple phrase
what-you-look-for-is-what-you-find (WYLFIWYF) (Hollnagel,
2008b).
There is a large body of literature from different research tradi-
tions such as Workplace Studies (Goodwin, 1994; Goodwin and
Goodwin, 1996; Heath and Luff, 1992; Star and Strauss, 1999;
Suchman, 1993, 1996), Distributed Cognition (Hutchins, 1995a,b)
and Science and Technology Studies (Latour, 1987; Law, 2000) that
have specialised in understanding mundane work practices that
usually do not grab the attention of many others than those
performing them and those who address them in their research
(see Engeström and Middleton, 1996 to understand how closely
related these research strands really are to each other). What these10 For those interested in etymology, secretary is indeed a telling label for work that
is invisible for those who profit from it.
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common is that they provide insightful analyses of situated work
and the adaptability and flexibility that characterise it, although
this is not reflected in formal procedures, prescriptions or presen-
tations of the same work and hence often goes unnoticed by others
than those who perform it (Star and Strauss, 1999; Suchman,
1995). Many of these studies address high-risk environments
(e.g. Heath and Luff, 1992 on London underground line control
rooms; Hutchins, 1995b on aircraft pilots; Suchman, 1993 on air-
line ground operations), but still they have not been well incorpo-
rated into the classical body of safety science literature. Although
we do not often come across these references reading the RE liter-
ature (but see for example Nemeth et al., 2004a; Woods and
Hollnagel, 2006), the relationship in terms of orientation between
Work Studies and RE – with its emphasis on work as done – seem
obvious and strong, and it is pregnant with a potential to enrich
both RE and safety science as a field. More explicit communication
with Work Studies could perhaps provide a more solid foundation
for RE, and at the same time add nuances to the contrast with HRO.
While also HRO indeed has a substantial empirical and ethno-
graphic tradition, of which the early studies of air traffic control
and naval air operations at sea (La Porte and Consolini, 1991) serve
as good examples, the glasses of HRO are more suitable for
accounting for structural and formal aspects of organisations than
the RE glasses – which are particularly suitable for capturing situ-
ated work. This can be explained by reference to the different aca-
demic fields that HRO and RE grew out of (see below).11
What Sutcliffe and Weick call ‘non-events’, Hollnagel calls
‘events’. In Work Studies, these are referred to as – ‘work’! Some-
times we come across the term ‘articulation work’ – ‘‘work that
gets things back ‘on track’ in the face of the unexpected, and mod-
ifies action to accommodate unanticipated contingencies” (Star
and Strauss, 1999: 10) which is a particular kind of work that in
HRO corresponds to preoccupation with failure, timely adjust-
ments and reconfiguration, and in RE is addressed as phenomena
labelled ‘adaptation’, ‘variability’ and ‘work as done’.
The cunning with the definition of safety as a dynamic non-
event is that the references ‘dynamic’ and ‘non-event’, although
forming a combination of an adjective and a noun that together
make up the definition of safety, have different referents. While
dynamic refers to the work processes (timely human adjustments),
non-event refers to the outcome of those work processes (no acci-
dent). When Hollnagel turns the tables and alters the definition, he
is essentially not doing much more than playing with words. But
our pragmatic perspective helps us here, because we know how
essentialistic definitions and differences may lead us astray from
the main objective. Although the definition of safety as a dynamic
event also strictly speaking refers to both process and outcome at
the same time, reading this through RE lenses brings to mind RE’s
preoccupation with the work process, such as the focus on variabil-
ity, adaptations, resonance, efficiency-thoroughness trade-offs and
the like, rather than the result. That is not to say that HRO is not
preoccupied with variability and adaptation; they are. The work
of Roe and Schulman emphasises the role of reliability profession-
als in making real-time decisions to adapt to variability in load and
generation within the California electricity system (Roe and
Schulman, 2008).12 But again, there are different connotations to
variability and adaptation in HRO and RE, and where HRO is norma-
tive, RE is not. Adaptations in HRO are closely (but not exclusively)11 We do not mean to say that HRO accounts for formal aspects while RE accounts
for informal, we point to the fact that different scientific disciplines have different
perspectives and strengths, and that this influences what one looks for and what one
sees. But of course, nobody keeps strictly within their own theoretical disciplines, so
in practice these borders are blurry.
12 See below for further discussion of Roe and Schulman’s study.
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nuanced elaboration), and is linked to the need for an organisation to
adjust itself under varying conditions. In RE there is little talk of
error. In RE it is an empirical observation that variability occurs, that
it is perceived as necessary by operators, and that simultaneous
variability and adaptations in many different functions may lead to
resonance – in other words they are phenomena that are fundamen-
tal elements in successful operations as well as adverse events. It is
this symmetry that has been referred to when RE calls for studying
normal operations – that is operations where the outcome is not
given. HRO, on the other hand, is grounded in an asymmetric philos-
ophy: Some organisations perform extraordinary well under
extreme conditions, and we should learn what it is that they do to
succeed and use this knowledge to build similar capacities in other
organisations.
4. Applications of HRO and RE in health research
From their original empirical fields of enquiry, both HRO and RE
have travelled into a wide range of empirical fields. The health field
has experienced considerable interest among safety researchers in
the later years. In keeping with our pragmatic approach, we shall
review briefly how HRO and RE have implemented and developed
their perspectives in this field. The aim is to demonstrate that HRO
and RE do not in general provide contradictory answers to the
question of how safety is achieved, but they produce and cultivate
different (although overlapping) discourses of safety, and provide
new knowledge within those discourses.
4.1. HRO
Health care organisations are not prominent in the earliest
studies of HROs – possibly because no health care organisations
were found to exhibit unambiguous high reliability characteristics
(Roberts and Rousseau, 1989). From around year 2000, two waves
of applied HRO research in the health sector seem to emerge in the
literature. The first wave is mainly concerned with organisational
design and structure, e.g. redundancy, decentralisation of decision
authority, distribution of knowledge and capacity for spontaneous
reconfiguration of the organisational structure (e.g. Carroll and
Rudolph, 2006; Gaba, 2000; Madsen et al., 2006; Tamuz and
Harrison, 2006). Authors in this tradition refer extensively to the
classical empirical HRO studies performed by the Berkeley group.
Gaba (2000) and Tamuz and Harrison (2006) also drew on Normal
Accident Theory as a complementary perspective. These authors
primarily used HRO theory as an analytic or diagnostic tool, to
characterise health service organisations and the ways they deal
with patient safety. However, their ultimate goal was to transform
hospitals into HROs, or at least to approach some of the character-
istics of HROs (Tamuz and Harrison, 2006: 1655). This strand of
research also provided reflections on the dilemmas and challenges
involved in transforming hospitals into HROs (Carroll and Rudolph,
2006; Madsen et al., 2006). For instance, Madsen et al. (2006) anal-
ysed a specific attempt at organisational redesign in a paediatric
intensive care unit by broadening the decision authority of bedside
nurses and at the same time increasing their competence. The mor-
tality rates decreased during this redesign and the unit had extre-
mely low turnover rates for nurses and therapists. However, it took
vigilant efforts from the unit leaders to buffer this fragile new
organisational design from the rest of the organisation, and in
the end, the unit reverted to its previous modus operandi. Madsen
et al. pointed out that the early HRO studies addressed organisa-
tions with ‘‘natural” buffers against outside pressures, such as
aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and nuclear power plants. It
might take prolonged and vigilant efforts to build and maintain
an HRO within a less protected environment.perspective. Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.08.010
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increasingly towards cultural aspects of organisations (e.g.
Sutcliffe, 2011; Vogus et al., 2010). Authors in this tradition fre-
quently refer to the notion of ‘organisational mindfulness’ (Weick
and Sutcliffe, 2001; Weick et al., 1999). A study by Pronovost
et al. (2006), for instance, launched a comprehensive framework
to improve culture in intensive care units. The framework includes
several organisational levels, from top management to front-end
staff. As the focus is on culture, the study is preoccupied with con-
textual factors that can exert lasting influences over organisational
behaviour. It is also worth noting that this and other applications
of HRO concepts are normative, as they aim at the identification
and implementation of measurable reliability interventions. The
ambition to identify ‘‘what works” is both an inheritance from
the HRO tradition, but is also an approach with strong roots within
evidence-based medicine. Methodologically, this ambition led to
stronger reliance on quantitative and experimental approaches,
in contrast to the qualitative and observational approaches that
prevailed in the early HRO studies. However, Tolk et al. (2015)
found that empirical research on high reliability cultures in health
care was geared towards developing better survey instruments
rather than developing interventions and tracking changes over
time to understand if changing the organisational culture also
changes organisational reliability.
This second wave of applied HRO research may be viewed as an
adaptation to the organisational and economic constraints in the
health sector. The sector is not protected from outside pressures
and the scope for modifying structures or building extensive
organisational redundancy may be limited. Accordingly, Vogus
et al. (2010) emphasised the extent to which safety culture inter-
ventions may also lead to improved efficiency or faster implemen-
tation of new technologies. The second wave may also be seen as
an approximation to the RE tradition. A symbolic token of this
approximation is the contribution of Sutcliffe & Weick to the first
anthology on Resilient Health Care (Hollnagel et al., 2013).
The impact of HRO in health care also includes organisational
development. In 2009, the Joint Commission, a non-profit accredi-
tation agency, launched the Joint Commission Center for Trans-
forming Health Care. This initiative explicitly aimed at
transforming health care into a high-reliability industry, and may
have contributed to the second wave of applied HRO research in
health care (Tolk et al., 2015).4.2. RE
The attempts to transform health care organisations into HROs
have been questioned by Nemeth and Cook (2007) and others with
the argument that health care is characterised by high variability,
diversity, partition between workers and managers, and produc-
tion pressure – in other words that a hospital is not an aircraft car-
rier. Consequently, Nemeth and Cook advocated a focus on
resilience rather than reliability.
Resilience is a term with many connotations, and resilience is
also an important topic in the HRO literature.13 The elaborations
on Safety I and Safety II in Hollnagel et al. (2015) and Hollnagel
(2013) contribute to articulating central aspects of resilience and
how it may be obtained through methodological reasoning. The
advice to study work as actually done, through studying everyday
work, and to focus on things that go right14 can be traced back to13 See Pettersen and Schulman (2016) for a thorough elaboration of different types
of resilience.
14 This advice contains both the symmetry argument (study not only that which
goes wrong, but also that which goes right), and the non-normative perspective
(adaptation of procedures should not necessarily be seen as non-compliance).
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cations on resilience in health care, the main ideas are still there, but
vocabulary and theory have developed so that it is possible to
approach the ideas frommore angles and pursue themwith different
methods. Thus, RE has gained footing and relevance in health
research and practice, reflected in two recent books on resilient
health care (Hollnagel et al., 2013; Wears et al., 2015).
Many of the contributions of RE to health care can be charac-
terised by a focus on everyday practices of practitioners, such as
nurses and surgeons (Debono and Braithwaite, 2015; Nyssen and
Blavier, 2013; Pariès et al., 2013). That does not mean, however,
that RE focuses on individuals and not organisations. The lack of
reference to organisational structure and organisational culture
in the RE literature, and the presence in the HRO literature, may
give the impression RE is little interested in organisations, while
HRO takes organisations more seriously. This looks different, how-
ever, when considering Braithwaite and Plumb’s (2015) way of
writing about organisations. Inspired by actor-network theory they
portray organisations as networks, leading attention primarily to
mundane actions, and only subsidiary to formal arrangements.
While this may be misunderstood as being more occupied
with the lower levels of the organisation and less with the
leadership level,15 Braithwaite and Plum are quite clear that this is
not the case:
‘‘The discrete surgeon, or anaesthetist or nurse, although impor-
tant, is not the optimal focus of attention in safety studies. Resi-
lience resides in and emerges from collective not individual
activities.”
[Braithwaite and Plumb, 2015: 127]
Our reading of the insistence on studying work as done in
health research does not point towards a stance in RE that formal
structures are not important, but the view that
‘‘[d]etailed studies using network approaches can uncover hid-
den social structures and unfolding practices which have more
relevance for how work actually gets done than any policy,
guideline, procedure or formal organisational chart.”
[Braithwaite and Plumb, 2015: 127]
In general, HRO and RE health research mirror some of the
characteristic differences that we see in the broader field of safety
research. While RE focuses on functional dependencies in local
everyday work, and explore the opportunities of exploiting vari-
ability, HRO researchers are more sensitive to producing safety
through building more lasting organisational cultures and struc-
tures. We also find a higher degree of normativity in HRO than
in RE. While the former keeps adding to the list of desirable
organisational characteristics and modi operandi, RE focuses more
on understanding the trade-offs and adaptations necessary in
everyday operations, and to organise for that. In that sense,
HRO seems to support scaling and benchmarking more than RE
does. Finally, we suggest that one way of thinking of the differ-
ences between, and strengths of, HRO and RE respectively is that
HRO studies how organisations work, while RE studies how ‘work
works’. They study the same empirical phenomena, but they rep-
resent different cultures of seeing – one particularly tuned for
organisations and organisational constraints, and the other partic-
ularly tuned for sociotechnical systems, the same and different
entities at the same time – they see and describe different kinds
of events.15 This may be a reason why an important task in RE now seems to also be to work
explicitly with the leadership level to ensure organisational acknowledgement of,
arranging for and – importantly – limits to the normal variability of work as done (e.g.
Grøtan et al., 2015).
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We have chosen to take the debate about dynamic non-events
(Hollnagel, 2014; Hollnagel et al., 2013) – which can be considered
as a proxy-debate about Safety I/Safety II – as a point of departure,
to feed off that controversy and use it as an instrument for provid-
ing content and direction to the HRO-RE debate. This phenomenon
– whether one chooses to call it non-event or event – is central to
safety science, it is intangible and concrete at the same time, and it
can be used as an entry point to understand some of the more fun-
damental differences between HRO and RE. In accordance with our
pragmatic approach, we have followed HRO and RE into a field of
practice, and we have argued that HRO and RE tend to see and
describe different, but not necessarily contradictory kinds of
events.
In the following, this content and direction will be presented as
a series of themes growing out from the preceding elaboration of
the controversy, and at the same time as pointers towards pre-
sumptively fruitful arenas for discussion, disagreements and
cross-fertilisation between the different approaches.5.1. Asymmetry and symmetry
RE has consistently argued for studying not only failure, but also
successes. That has been based on the arguments that (1) the
mechanisms behind successful operations are the same as the
mechanisms behind failures, namely performance variability and
resonance (symmetry) and (2) there are far more successes than
failures, and hence far more empirical material to learn from by
studying and learning from successes than limiting safety science
to learning from and preventing things from going wrong. HRO is
also associated with successful operations, but in a different man-
ner. HRO’s argument for studying successful operations, which was
the rationale and the background for HRO, was rather one of asym-
metry16: they set out to study what it is that these particularly safe
organisations do that distinguishes them from less successful organ-
isations. Based on these studies, the HRO group came up with organ-
isational characteristics that are distinctive for safe organisations.
However the highly reliable organisations themselves ‘‘pay more
attention to failures than success” (Weick, 2011: 24). So the asym-
metry is somewhat double. Thus, we may say that the RE community
has been more occupied with the nature of work and sociotechnical
systems, being perhaps a bit modest in establishing causal relations
to outcomes, while the HRO community has been more occupied
with the nature of organisations, and with linking organisational
characteristics causally to outcomes.5.2. The exceptional versus the generic
The early HRO research may be presented as the story of an
intriguing discovery. The researchers found organisations capable
of extremely reliable performance under demanding conditions.
Their main contribution was to theorise and report the discovery
of this rare species. The subsequent applied research sought to
make ordinary organisations more like HROs, i.e. to build proper-
ties associated with HROs in order to approach the reliability
performance of HROs. These efforts met with organisational con-
straints, as illustrated by the study of Madsen et al. (2006) dis-
cussed above. Consequently, HRO researchers have developed a16 Symmetry and asymmetry in everyday language often have positive and negative
connotations. It is important to note that in the current context, such connotations are
not relevant. The symmetry argument has nothing to do with harmony, and the
asymmetric approach is well grounded in valid methodology.
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tions, recognising that different kinds of HROs use different means
to achieve reliable performance (Schulman, 1993).
RE has been more generic in its ambitions and orientation. A
broad range of industries were studied from the outset, without
a clear preference for organisations or systems displaying excep-
tional degrees of reliability or resilience (e.g. Hollnagel et al.,
2006). Particularly complex and dynamic systems have received
special attention, not because of their performance, but because
of the challenges they pose to operators, organisations and resili-
ence engineers. Generalisability of results and concepts has not
been a great issue, although Hale and Heijer (2006) have argued
from an ‘‘outsider” position that some systems (e.g. railways)
achieve excellent safety records by means other than resilience.
An interesting exception is Nemeth and Cook’s (2007) argument
that health care should strive for resilience rather than high relia-
bility due to the constraints facing the organisations.
This is another example of HRO and RE seeing different things
due to their different perspectives. It is conceivable that this dis-
tinction may erode in the future if HRO research is assimilated into
consulting work and subjected to standardisation and the con-
straints of mass production. We shall argue that this complemen-
tarity between HRO and RE illustrates that we need both
perspectives.5.3. Limiting versus embracing variability
A conspicuous feature of many HROs is the reluctance of oper-
ators to enter uncharted territory (Schulman, 1993). Operators
make complex systems tractable by restricting the system to states
that are familiar and have been thoroughly analysed. They achieve
predictability and coordination by limiting process variability, for
instance by adhering strictly to procedures.
Inspired by Ashby’s (1956) law of requisite variety, RE propo-
nents have repeatedly promoted the opposite strategy, i.e. to
increase diversity and process variability in order to match vari-
ability in inputs, demands and constraints (e.g. Dekker, 2011).
Sheps and Cardiff (2013) thus argued that a clear distinction needs
to be made between quality and safety in health care because the
two rely on opposite strategies, i.e. limitation of variability and
exploitation of variability respectively.
We shall argue that the two approaches to variability are more
complementary than they may seem at first sight, and that this
complementarity could give rise to research that is highly relevant
to dilemmas faced by practitioners navigating the difficult path
between loss of control and loss of resilience.5.4. Normative/non-normative
HRO is more normative than RE. This is natural, taking HRO’s
asymmetric approach into account; the HRO research tradition is
built on an argument that particularly successful operations have
particular characteristics, and that other organisations can obtain
a better safety record by adopting the same characteristics,17 a
process that require comparison, scaling and benchmarking. RE, on
the other hand, is more occupied with functions and their variability,
and how they in combination may cause unintended, intractable
couplings and consequences. The measure of safety for HRO is thus
similar to their point of departure – the safety track record or the
non-event – while the measure of safety for RE is rather the under-
standing of the nature of events, understood as the ability to make17 The list of characteristics is not closed, however, and HRO encourages scholars to
continue investigating more organisations to expand the horizon of high reliability
(Bourrier, 2011).
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adaptive universe (Woods, 2015).
5.5. Addressee
It is our impression that HRO and RE appeal to different levels
within organisations.19 This is not surprising, since HRO as a
research tradition came out of political science, public administra-
tion, organisation theory and business schools,20 and was followed
up by scholars with background in organisation theory and organisa-
tion behaviour, while RE came more from the engineering, human
machine interaction and human factors side. RE researchers have
been particularly interested in the difference between work as imag-
ined (prescribed) and work as actually done (practice), and have
approached this in a pragmatic manner – interested in the rationale
for this difference rather than seeing it as complacency. Organisa-
tional structure and organisational culture are seldom mentioned
in the RE literature, while in HRO these are seen as factors that affect
the collective organisational achievements and that should be
designed and shaped deliberately. Perhaps for these reasons, RE
may appear more comprehensible and intuitive for the operating
environment who are concerned with operations (events), while
the managerial level are more familiar with the abstract indicators
of work and the results of work, particularly non-events, and how
these can be used to inform the conscious shaping of organisational
structures and cultures.
5.6. Origin and orientation
The appeal to different organisations described above is
reflected in different orientations towards academic journals21;
while HRO research is often published in organisational journals,
RE research often finds its way into journals more oriented towards
human factors and technology. This is of course also associated with
HRO’s and RE’s relation to different academic disciplines. Many
scholars writing within the HRO school have backgrounds in political
science and organisational psychology, and many of the classical
works have been published in journals such as the Journal of Contin-
gencies and Crisis Management (La Porte, 1994, 1996; La Porte and
Rochlin, 1994; Weick, 2011), Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory (La Porte and Consolini, 1991), California Man-
agement Review (Weick, 1987), Research in Organisational Beha-
viour (Weick et al., 1999) and Administrative Science Quarterly
(Weick, 1993; Weick and Roberts, 1993). In the case of RE, central
contributors have backgrounds in industrial psychology, systems
engineering and human factors, and examples of popular journals
and conferences for central contributors within RE have been Safety
Science (Hollnagel, 2008c; Woods, 2009), Cognition, Technology and
Work (Dekker and Hollnagel, 2004; Henriqson et al., 2011;
Hollnagel, 2012a), Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science
(Woods and Dekker, 2000), IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and
Cybernetics (Nemeth et al., 2004a,b).
Theory and model development within the different research
strands must be understood in relation to the history of their ori-
gins, academic traditions and publication practices. HRO and RE
are dealing with different views on safety. From Science and Tech-
nology Studies (Latour, 1987; Latour and Woolgar, 1986) we know
that HRO and RE are also actors on a stage where survival and18 Functional Resonance Analysis Method (Hollnagel, 2012b).
19 This is not necessarily HRO’s and RE’s intention, but more the response from the
organisations themselves. However, Grøtan (2013) has argued that RE should put
greater effort into addressing the management level.
20 And physics (Gene Rochlin).
21 The co-existence at arm’s length has been reflected also in the journal/conference
proceedings; Safety Science is an exception and an example of a common dissem-
ination arena.
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reaching social networks22 and alliances as on doing the most
thorough and persuasive empirical studies and presenting the best
theoretical evidences.6. Looking ahead – is there fertile ground for innovative
research in the borderlands between HRO and RE?
The discussion of the relationship between HRO and RE high-
lights several aspects related to the foundations of safety science.
One is the relationship between failure and success. RE proponents
make a case for studying everyday operations, that is, situations
where things mostly go right. There is, however, a possible prob-
lem of induction (Chalmers, 1978) inherent in this approach. If
we set out to study normal operations, the study will need to have
some sort of demarcation of what aspects of normal operations are
considered to be relevant to safety. Such criteria may come from
past experiences where things have gone wrong in the sense that
operations have led to negative consequences. Thus, it may be
asked whether the study of safety-related success requires some
sort of knowledge about the possible ways it could have become
a failure. Without having some notion about what can go wrong,
it is hard to have a conceptualisation of right. The epistemological
discussion of the relationship between success and failure is an
important discussion regardless of which definition and theory of
safety one subscribes to.
The difficulties in seeing success without having a reference of
failure is further complicated by the fact that there are many ways
of failing, each of which has a different set of contributing causes,
which only partly overlap. That means that there are many ways of
succeeding which have to combine elements relating to each of the
failure scenarios. Success against one set of scenarios may still per-
mit failure against others, as the Deepwater Horizon case shows,
with the senior management present to celebrate the success
against occupational accidents just before the disastrous blow-
out. A similar mismatch between different forms of success was
also described in Hale’s (1989) comparison of Dutch railways’
exemplary performance in passenger safety and their dire perfor-
mance on safety of track maintenance personnel.
Another obvious approach that could be explored in the inter-
face between HRO and RE, is the combination of in-depth studies
of work with an understanding of the organisational settings in
which this work takes place. It is an assumption of HRO research
that some organisational arrangements are conducive to success,
but this link is not sufficiently understood. For instance, in high risk
industries, resilience and adaptation usually take place within a
context of highly regulated and rule-based management. The term
‘‘resilience in context” (RICO) has previously been used by Grøtan
(2014) to denote the way resilient practices take place within a
managerial and organisational context. The interplay between sta-
tic properties and dynamic adaptations is familiar terrain for both
HRO and RE researchers, but there is a potential for addressing this
domain more explicitly, emancipated from commitments to HRO
and RE, but with sensitivity for controversies and an aim to explore
these to bring forward new knowledge. In many ways, the concept
of resilience is a linguistic boundary object that makes communi-
cation across domains possible. Exploring such boundary objects
can be a way of making safety science more cumulative and inte-
grated as a scientific community.
When theories meet practice, we should be careful thinking
about the areas of the theories’ validity; as Schulman (1993) also22 Examples of such initiatives facilitating interaction and communication are the
Resilient Health Care Initiative (http://www.resilienthealthcare.net) and the San
Bernardino HRO group (http://high-reliability.org/san-bernardino-group).
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organisations and systems – and different levels within those – is
crucial in order to produce well-grounded analyses. Theoretical
accurateness could be strengthened if analyses are more explicit
in their references to the generic and the particular respectively,
and we believe there is a potential for both HRO and RE to con-
tribute to defining each other’s areas of validity. This could also
contribute to developing and refining the classification of types
of organisations and systems that has not been much challenged
since Perrow (1984) introduced the interaction/coupling chart.
This issue also has important practical aspects. Under what condi-
tions is it feasible to build an HRO? When does a system reach a
degree of complexity or a kind of dynamics that cannot be handled
by efforts to build resilience? Such issues are particularly impor-
tant if companies look for HRO or RE principles as a means to
reduce the costs of safety or to stretch the organisation’s capacity
to meet extreme demands for flexibility or efficiency.
It is important to underline that some researchers have already
contributed to the borderlands between HRO and RE. Roe and
Schulman’s (2008) work on High reliability management is one
example. On the one hand their study of the California electricity
grid is placed within an HRO tradition in the sense that they try
to find the properties that can explain high reliability in tightly
coupled and highly interactive systems (electricity infrastruc-
tures). On the other hand their study is centred on the role of con-
trol room operators and the way these operators make continuous
adaptations in real time. This means that they describe and com-
pare their case to different HRO properties, while at the same time
describing successful adaptation on a micro level. Their work is
thus both on an organisational and operational level.
The exploration of the borderlands between HRO and RE calls
for research that is more ‘box-breaking’ than ‘boxed in’ in the sense
of being able to transcend or bridge narrowly defined areas of
study (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2014). That includes continuing
expanding the repertoire to fold new theoretical and methodolog-
ical resources into the field of safety science. One example of such
initiatives can be found in the attempts to contribute to existing
safety discourses by drawing on Science and Technology Studies
(e.g. Braithwaite and Plumb, 2015; Haavik, 2013, 2014a,b, 2016a,
b; Le Coze, 2013, 2016).
7. Conclusion
As previous research within science studies has shown (e.g.
Latour, 1999; Latour and Woolgar, 1986), the intellectual work
and social function of new concepts must be understood in terms
of the functions they perform for the communities of science and
research practice. Purely essentialistic analyses of theories, models,
mechanisms and definitions tend to miss out many important
aspects of scientific fields and the work these fields do. The intel-
lectual and practical driving forces of HRO and RE are not solely
their distinctive views on the ontology of safety, but also the con-
text they grow out from, the theoretical and research-practical alli-
ances they form and the research portfolio they produce. Hence,
the difference between HRO and RE lies not so much in the
answers they give as in the questions they ask.
There are no approaches in safety science that capture into one
theory or one model everything that explains why and how failures
and successes are achieved. Neither HRO nor RE has that ambition.
The ambition should be that safety science manages to produce
and maintain different perspectives that may contribute to the col-
lective task of continuously increasing the knowledge of how
organisations and sociotechnical systems work, and how they
work safely. But organisations and sociotechnical systems change,
and the world they exist within changes, so the knowledge will
never be complete.Please cite this article in press as: Haavik, T.K., et al. HRO and RE: A pragmaticWe have used a subtle discussion of dynamic non-events as a
leverage to explore how the relation between HRO and RE can be
made more visible. By treating the discussion as a controversy,
and by feeding off the controversy instead of trying to overcome
it by essentialistic means, we have elaborated on some themes that
may be useful to understand how HRO and RE relate to each other
in terms of symmetry, normativity, addressees and academic asso-
ciations. We do not suggest that this description is exhaustive or
superior to any other descriptions. It should rather be seen as a
pragmatic effort to use different perspectives constructively. This
description can also be read as a suggestion of a method – that of
feeding off controversies – for obtaining the same, so that we can
have a fruitful debate, co-existence and cross-fertilisation between
HRO and RE, avoiding the deadlock of the NAT-HRO debate. This
paper may also be read as an example of employing such a method,
and demonstrating the concrete outcomes that this approach may
produce; we have produced a critical elaboration of the definition
of safety as a dynamic non-event, an elaboration of the distinction
between Safety I and Safety II, and a nuancing of how we may
understand and study successful operations. The important thing
here is that it is the difference and the co-existence between
HRO and RE that makes these discussions possible. Still, without
discussion and controversies HRO and RE do not do a good job of
making each other relevant. We therefore call for a more lively dis-
cussion on central themes of HRO and RE, not for fighting over def-
initions and proving who is right, but with the aim of producing
knowledge that makes a difference regardless of theoretical stance.
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